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It seems to be unfortunately 
true that the epidemic of world 
lawlessness is spreading. When an 
epidemic of physical disease starts 
to spread, the community ap-
proves and joins in a quarantine in 
order to protect the health of the 
community against the spread of 
the disease.1 
Although President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's quarantine address, which 
was delivered in Chicago on 5 October 
1937, failed to outline any detailed 
national or international program which 
would deter potential aggressors, this 
particular speech was at least a frank 
and open invitation to military and 
political leaders at home and abroad to 
reappraise the tenets of isolationism and 
appeasement which had become im-
bedded in the basic structure of their 
nations' foreign policies. Perhaps the 
President was not individually ready to 
initiate or direct an international pro-
gram of collective action but, by 1937, 
he was becoming obviously un-
comfortable "rithin the confines of the 
Neutrality Acts where, to some extent, 
he had placed himself and the country. 
Japan's earlier refusal to abide by her 
naval limitations and the gradual col-
lapse of the League of Nations, together 
with the years of creeping conflicts up 
to 1937, had a profound and dis-
couraging effect upon that Kellogg-
Briand world which had been assured, 
with engaging naivety, that war was 
outlawed. It was also becoming ap-
parent that the United States could not 
really snuggle under a blanket of isola-
tion and tuck out the international 
community. The President, therefore, 
was leaning toward closer ties with 
peaceful nations-but the American 
public was not ready. 
Isolationists, pacifists, protectionists, 
and internationalists of every hue ex-
amined the body of the President's 
speech and found, according to their 
bent, some reason to reject it. Spectres 
of embargoes, sanctions, boycotts, for-
eign entanglements, neutrality viola-
tions, and the abandonment of the 
Monroe Doctrine stalked across the 
pages of America's newspapers and 
periodicals. These critics continued to 
haunt the President until, with dis-
couraging finality, the abortive Brussels' 
Conference of late 1937 disclosed that 
unity of effort was an unstable com-
modity in both the domestic and the 
international market. 
This germ of isolation, which had 
infected the country since World War I, 
had not altogether spared the officers of 
the United States Navy, even as late as 
1937. One wrote: 
The New World with the sup-
port of the United States is 
completely self-sufficient and im-
pregnable to almost any type of 
attack. The United States and the 
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New World remain intact in the 
face of potential world destruc-
tion.2 
Collective Blockades. Although many 
courses of positive action could have 
been effected under the President's 
"quarantine" banner, there is an obvi-
ous facet of naval involvement which is 
particularly noticeable by its absence. 
The concept of collective pacific block-
ades, which had been formerly em-
ployed with some success, was not 
considered as a possible ocean strategy 
against aggressors between 1935 and 
1939. Was this because of international 
reluctance, military inability, illegality 
(under international law), or a genuine 
failure to review the operational prac-
ticality of suppressing aggression 
through limited confrontation on the 
high seas? 
As a precedent for action there had 
been about 20 collective pacific block-
ade cases effectively recorded before 
World War II. In 1827 Russia, France, 
and Great Britain, acting in concert, 
blockaded the Morea to prevent the 
Turkish fleet from coming out of Nava-
rino during one of the many Turkish-
Greek disputes. Again, in 1833, the 
French and British forces blockaded the 
Netherlands until the Dutch carried out 
an 1831 treaty which provided for the 
independence of Belgium. 
From 1845-1850 the French and the 
British blockaded Uruguay to cut off 
Argentine supplies to the Oribe forces; 
and in 1897 Britain, France, Austria, 
Germany, Italy, and Russia blockaded 
Crete to prevent other nations from 
delivering weapons to Greek insurgents. 
These collective blockades were both 
pacific and effective and demonstrated 
how combined naval action could create 
stability within an area.3 
The League of Nations also could 
have directed a collective pacific block-
ade based on its covenant and the 
principle that "any state or states may 
blockade the coasts and ports of an-
other state in time of peace to coerce 
the latter into acting in accordance with 
the wishes of the blockading state or 
states. '>4 
Great Britain and the United States, 
for example, had recently acquiesced to 
this legal gambit when Japan set up a 
"pacific blockade on 25 August 1937 of 
the territory between the mouth of the 
Yangtze and Swatow for all Chinese 
vessels and nonpeaceful cargo of third 
states. "5 
By the spring of 1938, then, the 
in ternational legality of collective 
pacific blockades was generally un-
questioned; the naval forces of the 
nonaggressor members of the League of 
Nations, together with the United States 
Navy, was superior to the collective 
navies of Japan, Germany and Italy; the 
violation of the Versailles Treaty and 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact provided 
sufficient aggravation for all other sig-
natories to demand a cessation of 
hostile acts; and the world seemed 
ready, if not really eager, to listen to 
advocates of containment. It is there-
fore surprising that naval officers and 
seapower savants-including President 
Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill-did not at 
least gravitate toward the advantages of 
using their combined naval forces as a 
threat against the greedy nations, par-
ticularly since the success of collective 
pacific blockades had been well docu-
mented. 
Enforcement and Theory. Ad-
mittedly the use of blockade as a 
weapon is hazardous for it can be as 
easily pointed in error toward the 
saintly as in honor toward the sinful. 
There are, nevertheless, certain singular 
advantages in using pacific blockades: 
1. Pressure can be applied on actual 
or potential aggressors away from terri-
torial boundaries by warships of the 
blockading states. 
2. Economic restrictions are effected 
without directly involving the native 
populace in conflict. 
3. Military units can be maintained 
in nonsovereign waters. 
4. International decisions may gravi-
tate toward areas less combatant in 
nature than war. 
5. The alternate avenues of arbitra-
tion, mediation, and conciliation can be 
thoroughly explored before war be-
comes inevitable. 
The theory of pacific blockade also 
has exceptional attraction. It is usually 
bloodless, which appeals to the humane; 
it is done with a minimum of military 
force, which entices economists and 
politicians; and it is imposed on the sea, 
away from the territory of the offend-
ing state, which results in an irresistible 
charm for statesmen and naval advo-
cates. Admiral Powers has written: 
Although it has been stated 
that unilateral pacific blockade is 
no longer permissible for an indi-
vidual member of the United 
Nations, the possibility of one 
should not be dismissed. A uni-
I a teral declaration of pacific 
blockade which was stated to be 
in the interest of world peace, 
which was justified by the action 
of the nation blockaded, and 
which was accepted by the world, 
should be upheld.6 
By 1937, a similar posture of en-
forcement which did not directly 
threaten the political structure of an-
other nation nor intrude upon its sover-
eignty with armed forces may have been 
the only rational answer to overt aggres-
sors. 
No attempt has been made to charge, 
in retrospect, that American leaders or 
naval officers were delinquent in not 
publicly proposing that collective pa-
cific blockades were a panacea for early 
Axis aggressions. Neither is there a 
directed verdict that collective pacific 
blockades could have been successfully 
effected or that their initiation would 
have thwarted or delayed the ambitious 
designs of Italy, Germany, or Japan. It 
is merely that the lack of naval 
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affiliation with quarantine bears scru-
tiny, not only because of the natural 
affinity benY'een naval power and for-
eign relations, but because writers, both 
then and now, have neglected to advo-
cate the possibility of using seapower 
and collective pacific blockades as an 
obstacle to expansionist movements. 
Navy Posture in the 1930's. The 
primary interests of the United States 
Navy in the 1930's were in the funding 
of a badly needed shipbuilding and 
research program and in the tactical 
training and operational readiness of its 
officers and men against possible future 
adversaries. 
If the United States Navy had been 
modernized and brought to the parity 
limits allowed by the Washington and 
London Conferences, perhaps her sea 
supremacy over all other nations, except 
Great Britain, would have encouraged 
adventures in power ploys abroad. At 
least, such leadership would have issued 
a temptation to use this force in interna-
tional discussions by" 1937-despite the 
isolationist sentiment that might have 
refused to sanction its actual applica-
tion. Unfortunately, the American Fleet 
was approximately 65 percent of treaty 
strength at this time, while the Japanese 
Fleet approached 95 percent; and, even 
when marines were being sent to Shang-
hai in August 1937, the Asiatic Fleet 
was only a modest force. It was not 
until after Great Britain entered World 
War 'n that President Roosevelt asked 
Congress to expand the Navy beyond 
the old treaty limits or to beef up the 
island outposts in the Pacific. 
The pretense of naval superiority 
through ceiling limitations had, in 
reality, severely handicapped the United 
States. The Navy had neither the ships 
nor men to enforce a unilateral pacific 
blockade against Italy in" 1935, and it 
was even less capable of effecting such 
action against Japan by 1937. 
There were, however, adequate 
grounds for proposing that the Presi-
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dent's quarantine might he translated 
into the fonuidahle posture of collective 
pacific hlockades. While such a plan 
would have heen more effective if it had 
heen. initiated against Italy in 1935, 
continued against Genuany in 1936, 
and used in its third phase against Japan 
in 1937, there was still an opportunity 
for a forthright comhined naval program 
in early 1938 if future European allies 
had joined the United States in a rela-
tively moderate confrontation of the 
three major aggressors hefore Munich. 
It is easy. to discard moderate sea-
power proposals as futile hecause they 
could not have altered the inevitahle 
course of hiStory. By 1937, for ex-
ample, the Nine Power Treaty had 
crumhled, initial aggression had heen 
tolerated, and the U.S. Neutrality Acts 
were a stern reality; hut the leaders of 
many nations seem to have· heen 
awakening to the need for action, even 
if they were divided or completely 
unaware of how their efforts could he 
directed. 
The imposition of collective pacific 
hlockades, therefore, still might have 
heen a valuahle strategy as a response to 
the President's quarantine quandary. It 
would have required delicate diplomacy, 
a strong legal position within the re-
straints of international law, coordi-
nated naval tactics, and exceptional 
leadership hy the heads of nations who 
contrihuted unit support. Perhaps these 
elements could have led puhlic opinion 
into the peace offensive toward which 
President Roosevelt dedicated his later 
efforts. 
An examination of comhined allied 
naval strengths and the suitahility of 
collective naval hlockades indicates that 
the fonuulation of a combined sea-
power posture would have heen one 
practical application of quarantine 
under international law-though cer-
tainly not the only possihle hulwark to 
the cupidity of the Axis leaders from 
1935 to 1939. 
However, after Great Britain deter-
mined to recognize Italy's conquest of 
Ethiopia and Hitler occupied Austria, 
there was no longer a major detour 
around Munich. No leaders sincerely 
desired to ratify aggression, hut neither 
did they wish to emhrace conflict. 
Collective action, while contemplated, 
never hecame a matter of active military 
involvement. .Pacific hlockades, while 
logical, were not equated with quaran-
tine hy naval or civilian scholars. The 
fleeting opportunity to test quarantine 
as a deterrent to aggression passed 
over the heads of seapower advocates 
from Octoher 1937 until Octoher 
1962. 
Since estahlishment of the United 
Nations, claims coercively to hlockade 
are to he measured against the require-
ments of self-defense, enforcement 
action hy regional arrangements, or 
police action hy the organized com-
munity. The position of quarantine, 
however, as a collective pacific hlock-
ade, still remains nehulous. 
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